Tenth report of the International Independent
Investigation Commission on political killings in Lebanon
Saturday, March 29, 2008
Report
Summary
The Security Council requested the International Independent Investigation
Commission to report every four months on its progress. This report is the tenth
provided by the Commission to date, and the first report of Commissioner D.A.
Bellemare who took office on January 1, 2008.
The report provides an update on the progress of the investigation, bearing in
mind confidentiality and security concerns. Progress in this reporting period
allows the Commission to confirm, on the basis of available evidence, that a
network of individuals acted in concert to carry out the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and that this criminal network or parts thereof are
linked to some of the other cases within the Commission's mandate. The
Commission's priority is now to gather more evidence about this network and the
extent of its links to other attacks.
Since the last report, the Commission is providing technical assistance to the
Lebanese authorities in their investigations into two additional attacks
targeting members of Lebanon's security forces, Major General Francois Al-Hajj
and Major Wissam Eid.
These recent attacks have contributed to a deteriorating security environment in
Lebanon. Despite mitigating measures put in place, this environment continues to
have an impact on the Commission's activities, albeit without affecting its
resolve.
The Commission has continued to work closely with the Lebanese authorities. The
Syrian Arab Republic has provided generally satisfactory cooperation. The
Commission has implemented new working practices to foster additional assistance
from Member States as well as to encourage cooperation by witnesses and other
sources.
The Commission has also continued to prepare for the transition to the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, bearing in mind that terrorist investigations are lengthy
and complex.
1. INTRODUCTION
1. This is the tenth report of the UN International Independent Investigation
Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005),
1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007). It outlines progress made
by the Commission since the last report delivered on November 28, 2007. This is
also the first report of Commissioner D.A. Bellemare who took office on January
1, 2008.
2. February 14, 2008 marked the third anniversary of the terrorist attack that
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 other persons. The
Commission was established to assist the investigation into this attack and
since that time, its technical assistance has been sought in 20 other
investigations, including two during the current reporting period. These
investigations involve a series of terrorist attacks that have caused the death
of dozens and injured hundreds more. In total, 61 people have been killed and at
least 494 injured.
3. Terrorist investigations are by definition complex and difficult. The
Commission faces additional challenges including the magnitude of the attacks,
their continuing nature, and the fact that the investigations are conducted in
an environment dominated by ongoing security concerns. Despite these
difficulties, the Commission has continued its methodical approach in assisting
the Lebanese authorities to solve the cases, being guided exclusively by the
facts and the evidence, and exploring all investigative leads.
4. Investigations of this complexity cannot be rushed. While the absence of
quick results may be frustrating for the surviving victims, the families of the
deceased, the Lebanese people, the international community, and for the
Commission itself, the experience of other investigations into similar crimes
proves that with sufficient time and resources, the perpetrators can be brought
to justice.
5. Given the need to preserve confidentiality in its investigations, the
Commission will not be disclosing any names. Names of individuals will only
appear in future indictments filed by the Prosecutor, when there is sufficient
evidence to do so.
6. This report outlines the political and security environment in which the
Commission operates; new developments in the Commission's work processes and
investigative priorities; cooperation with national and international
authorities; and challenges inherent to the Commission's work. Finally, the
report addresses steps that the Commission is taking to prepare for the
transition to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT
7. The political situation in Lebanon remains at an impasse, despite numerous
attempts to elect a successor to President Emile Lahoud whose term expired in
November 2007. Domestic and international efforts to resolve this crisis have so
far been unsuccessful.
8. In the last four months, the Commission witnessed a deteriorating security
environment. A number of attacks targeted members of the Lebanese security
forces and the international community. The political and economic conditions in
the country have also led to a number of street demonstrations that resulted in
violent clashes and shootings.
9. On December 12, 2007, the Head of Operations of the Lebanese Armed Forces,
Brigadier General Fran¨ois Al-Hajj - posthumously promoted to Major General -
and his driver were killed in a bomb attack that injured nine others. On January
25, 2008, the Head of the technical section of the Information Branch of the
Internal Security Forces, Captain Wissam Eid - posthumously promoted to Major -
was killed in a similar type of explosion together with five other victims.
Forty-two people were also injured in this attack.
10. UNIFIL troops were attacked, for the third time in the last nine months, on
January 8, 2008.
A week later, on January 15, 2008, three people were killed and others wounded
by a roadside bomb that detonated as an American Embassy vehicle drove by.
11. This climate of insecurity has led embassies to take a number of measures to
protect their citizens in Lebanon including, in some cases, warnings to avoid
travel to the country.
12. The Commission has also implemented measures to address security issues.
However, continued attacks on Lebanese officials and members of the
international and diplomatic community, violent demonstrations and sporadic
clashes between rival factions, as well as ongoing tensions within Palestinian
refugee camps, remain a concern and have impacted the freedom of movement of
Commission staff. The increasing violence has not, however, affected the
Commission's resolve.
3. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
3.1. New Practices
13.The Commission has accelerated the pace of its operations. Since it last
report, it has more than doubled the number of Requests for Assistance (RFAs)
sent to Lebanon and other States, from 123 to 256.
14. The Commission has also developed new investigative priorities and
reallocated resources to support them. It has drawn up a revised schedule of
priority interviews and re-interviews and implemented new procedures to
streamline the process.
15.To improve the response time for forensic results, the Commission has
increased the number of international laboratories it has access to. It has also
obtained ready access to information databases on wanted persons, individuals
with criminal records, missing or deceased persons, stolen identification
documents and motor vehicles as well as DNA profiles and fingerprints.
3.2. Fostering Assistance
from States
16.While the Commission is independent, it cannot operate in a vacuum. Indeed,
the Commission acts on behalf of Member States and its success depends on their
timely and effective assistance.
17. The Commission demonstrated a renewed flexibility in the way assistance
could be provided by Member States. The Commissioner has met with ambassadors
and other State representatives and offered a new approach to cooperation:
rather than operating solely on the basis of specific RFAs, State
representatives were asked how they could support the Commission and informed of
generic areas of assistance that could match their capabilities and the
Commission's requirements.
18. This new flexible approach has already yielded results. The Commission is
grateful to those States that have come forward with expertise or are
endeavoring to make resources available. The Commission has found that even when
resources are provided on a short-term basis, they can still make an important
contribution to its work. It therefore renews its call for assistance to all
Member States.
3.3. Providing a Secure
Environment for Cooperation
19. The Commission is mindful of the essential role played by witnesses and
confidential sources as its investigation progresses and of the importance of
identifying individuals prepared to appear as witnesses in future trials.
20. As a result, the Commission has implemented measures to reinforce a secure
cooperation environment for these individuals and to protect the information it
receives. It has enhanced its systems to protect highly sensitive information
shared by witnesses and other sources, and has implemented a witness protection
strategy specifically adapted to the future requirements of the Tribunal and
based on internationally recognized best practices.
4. PROGRESS IN THE
INVESTIGATIONS
21.Confidentiality is key to any investigation. In reporting, the Commission
continues to respect its obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the
investigation, both to avoid compromising investigative techniques and to
protect people and evidence.
22. This section will provide an overview of the progress of the investigation
in the Hariri case and other cases within the mandate of the Commission. It will
refer to factual findings made during the reporting period, bearing in mind
confidentiality and security concerns.
4.1. Hariri Investigation
23. The investigation in the Hariri case continues to be active in all areas.
Its work has covered forensic examinations, analysis and evidence-gathering,
including 34 interviews, some of which complex and time-consuming.
24. In its last report the Commission mentioned a hypothesis that operational
links may exist between some of the possible perpetrators of the different
crimes under investigation.
25. The Commission can now confirm, on the basis of available evidence, that a
network of individuals acted in concert to carry out the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri and that this criminal network the "Hariri Network" - or parts thereof
are linked to some of the other cases within the Commission's mandate.
26. The Commission has also gathered evidence establishing that (i) the Hariri
Network existed before the Hariri assassination; (ii) it conducted surveillance
of Rafiq Hariri before the assassination; (iii) it was operative on the day of
his assassination; and (iv) at least part of the Hariri Network continued to
exist and operate after the assassination.
27. The Commission's priority is now to gather more evidence about the Hariri
Network, its scope, the identity of all its participants, their links with
others outside the Network and their role in other attacks that have been found
to be linked.
28. The Commission will also focus on identifying links between the Hariri
Network and the remaining attacks within the Commission's mandate, and where
these links are found to exist the nature and scope of these links.
29. The Commission has also pursued its investigation into the identification of
the suicide bomber in the Hariri case. It has compared forensic information
described in previous reports on the origin, characteristics and movements of
the bomber to entry-exit records as well as the missing-persons files of various
countries to generate leads on the possible identity of the bomber. Based on
these leads, DNA profiling is being conducted to further assist the
identification.
4.2. Progress in Other
Investigations
30. The Commission currently has a mandate to assist the Lebanese authorities in
the investigation of 20 attacks other than the Hariri attack. Investigations in
these other cases also support the Hariri investigation.
31. Since its last report, the Commission has been requested by the Security
Council to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of the attacks
targeting Major General Francois Al-Hajj and Major Wissam Eid. As a result, the
Commission's mandate currently encompasses, in addition to the Hariri
investigation, investigations into two types of attacks: eleven "targeted
attacks" on politicians, journalists and security officials, and nine
"non-targeted attacks" involving bombings in public places.
32. To date, the Commission has provided assistance in these other
investigations in areas such as forensics analysis; conducting interviews;
creating crime-reconstructions and three-dimensional modeling of crime scenes;
communications analysis; development of timelines of victims' movements;
collection, enhancement and review of imagery material; and analysis of email
traffic. The Commission has also launched a project to create standardized
computer- generated sketches relevant to the investigations.
33. The Commission is also continuing to investigate links between these cases
and the Hariri case and progress in this area has been summarized earlier in
this report. During the reporting period, 58 interviews were conducted as part
of the technical assistance provided to the Lebanese authorities in these cases,
including the investigation of the links between them and the Hariri case.
34. The Commission has also examined all physical items found at the crime
scenes of the targeted attacks, including license plates and possible remains of
improvised explosive devices. Fifty-eight items are currently undergoing further
forensic analyzis (DNA, fingerprints, explosives, toolmarks, paint and metal) at
international laboratories and reports comparing the results in each of the
investigations with the results in the Hariri investigation will follow.
35. The Commission also temporarily redeployed resources to the two new cases to
fully exploit the opportunity to collect fresh evidence from these crime scenes
and to interview witnesses while they still easily recall events.
4.3. Murder of Major General Fran¨ois A1-Hajj
36. At 07:06 on Wednesday December 12, 2007, a bomb placed in a parked car was
detonated as the vehicle of Major General Fran¨ois Al-Hajj, the Head of
Operations of the Lebanese Army, drove by, killing Al-Hajj and his driver. Two
days later, the Commission was invited by the Security Council to provide
technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of this
attack.
37. International forensics experts working for the Commission conducted a
week-long forensic examination of the crime scene in cooperation with the
Lebanese authorities, as well as an investigation of the area surrounding
Al-Hajj's residence. A total of 112 physical items were recovered, most of which
are currently being analyzed at an international laboratory.
38. Analysis is underway to confirm preliminary findings about the improvised
explosive device and to determine the type and quantity of explosives used in
the attack.
4.4. Murder of Major Wissam Eid
39. At 09:54 on Friday January 25, 2008, an explosion in a busy area of Beirut
targeted Major Wissam Eid, Head of the technical section of the Lebanese
Internal Security Forces' Information Branch. Eid, his driver, and four others
were killed in the attack. Six days later, on January 31, 2008, the Commission
was invited by the Security Council to provide technical assistance in the
investigation.
40. International forensics experts working for the Commission examined the
crime scene for six days in cooperation with the Lebanese authorities. A total
of 136 physical items were recovered, most of which are currently being analyzed
at an international laboratory.
41. Although the investigation into this attack is still at an early stage, the
Commission has already been able to isolate relevant DNA profiles. Initial
expert findings also indicate that the type of explosive used in this attack was
TNT and RDX.
42. In addition to its forensic work, the Commission has conducted a series of
interviews to establish Eid's routines and regular movements; his specific
movements in the weeks prior to his death; and his professional profile,
including the work he was conducting and the level of public knowledge of that
work. Interviews have also focused on gathering observations from individuals
present at the crime scene and in the surrounding area at relevant times.
43. In the new cases, the Commission is working on a profile of the targeted
victim and possible motives for the attack. It is also investigating links with
other targeted attacks, including the one that targeted Hariri.
5. COOPERATION WITH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
5.1. Lebanese Authorities
44. The Commission continues to maintain regular contact and interact closely
with the Lebanese authorities on matters related to its investigations, as well
as on matters relating to the security of the Commission and its staff. The
Commission continues to enjoy the close and collegial cooperation with these
authorities that has consistently been noted in previous reports.
45. The Prosecutor General of Lebanon remains the main interlocutor of the
Commission. The Commission continues to meet with him and his staff on an almost
daily basis to follow up on the increasing number of RFAs submitted to him. The
Commissioner has also held more frequent bilateral meetings with the Prosecutor
General to keep him informed of the Commission's activities and progress.
46. The Commission also held meetings with the investigative judge for the
Hariri case and made a detailed presentation of its forensic findings to the
investigative judges in the Al-Hajj and Eid cases.
47. As the investigation continues, the Commission shares with the competent
Lebanese authorities the substance of all relevant information obtained, without
compromising the source of that information, to enable them to make an
independent assessment of the evidence acquired to date and to act in accordance
with that assessment, including in relation to detention.
48. The Commission continues to be extremely grateful to the Lebanese security
forces for their relentless and effective support and assistance in protecting
the Commission's staff and premises, without which the Commission could not
continue its work.
5.2. Syria
49. Since its last report, the Commission has submitted 8 RFAs to the Syrian
Arab Republic (Syria). Syria has continued to provide responses to these RFAs
within appropriate timeframes. The Syrian authorities have also, during this
period, facilitated one mission to Syria.
50. The Commission acknowledges the logistical and security arrangements made by
the Syrian authorities for the Commission's mission to that country. The
cooperation provided by the Syrian authorities continues to be generally
satisfactory.
51.The Commission will continue to request Syria's full cooperation in the
discharge of its mandate.
5.3. Other States
52. Out of the 256 RFAs issued by the Commission during this reporting period,
28 were sent to 11 Member States other than Lebanon and Syria.
53. Member States responded positively to the Commission's requests, mostly
within appropriate timeframes. Timely responses to requests for assistance are
crucial to the progress of the investigation.
6. CHALLENGES
54. In addition to the challenges inherent to the general political and security
climate, other challenges must be overcome by the Commission in its day-to-day
operations.
55. Over the years, a number of cases have been added to the Commission's
mandate without a proportionate increase in resources, adding pressure to staff
and their work. Six new cases have been added to the Commission's mandate since
November 2006 without any additional resources to meet this increased workload.
The number of investigators and analysts continues to be far lower than in
comparable investigations.
56. In addition, traditional methods of investigation need to be adapted to the
current environment. For example, the close scrutiny of the movements of
Commission investigators, combined with the security climate, can hinder their
ability to operate discreetly. In addition, issues such as the language
capabilities of witnesses and investigators, cultural differences and security
concerns affect the conduct of interviews.
7. TRANSITION
7.1. The Process
57. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1757 (2007)
establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and consistent with the recent
report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to that resolution
(S/2008/173), preparations for a transition from the Commission to the Office of
the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have continued. The fact that
the Commissioner is also the Prosecutor-Designate will ensure a coordinated
transition between the two institutions.
58. When the Prosecutor is sworn in, he will review all the materials
transmitted to him by the Commission and the Lebanese judicial authorities.
Following this review, he may direct that additional investigations be conducted
before being satisfied that the admissible evidence justifies the filing of an
indictment. Only then will he submit an indictment for confirmation by the
pre-trial judge. Experience has taught that this process is not instantaneous.
7.2. Preparatory Steps
59. The Commission's electronic data, documentary holdings and physical evidence
are being prepared for the transition to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. These preparations include organizing the physical
transfer of evidentiary materials in accordance with applicable international
standards.
60. The Commission has also assumed custody of all physical items that were
seized from various locations relevant to the Hariri investigation, and is
making an inventory of them. The Commission is cooperating with the Prosecutor
General and the investigative judge in the Hariri case in the preparation of the
transfer of documents and exhibits in possession of the Lebanese authorities to
the Tribunal.
61. The transition raises untested legal issues at the crossroads of Lebanese
and international criminal laws. The Commission has begun reviewing these
issues.
8. Conclusion
62. The Commission's investigation must continue to be guided solely by the
facts and by the evidence. Its conclusions cannot rely on rumor or assumption;
they must be supported by reliable evidence that will be admissible before a
tribunal.
63. The search for justice must be allowed to follow its course. As the
preparatory steps for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon continue, the Commission
remains committed to that search with vigor and determination.