Who is deterring whom? (Haaratz)
By Ze'ev Schiff
Each side in the fighting in Lebanon is convinced that it is deterring the other. However, each side is actually deterring itself, regardless of its military might.On the Lebanese basketball court, there are only two stars: Israel and Syria. But there are also second-rank players, such as Hezbollah, which is the instrument Syria uses to express its anger, and Lebanon, which is paying a heavy price although it is not actively involved in the fighting. We must not forget another second-ranker: the South Lebanon Army, which is now in suspended animation but could make a surprising move. And there is another player behind the scenes: Iran, which is stage-managing some of the events by remote control and which is adding fuel to the Lebanese fire.

Hezbollah, currently in euphoria over its recent victories, wants to lose no time in exploiting these tactical successes. Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, with or without a peace treaty with Syria; however, to gain a few more points, Hezbollah will try to create the impression that Israel is fleeing from Lebanon. To achieve this goal, Hezbollah does not have to fire Katyushas at the Galilee; killing off as many Israeli soldiers as possible will do the trick. The organization is careful not to launch attacks on Israeli soil so as to avoid angering the Syrians, who allow it to operate within restricted parameters. It must also be careful not to anger the Lebanese public too much because there are many Lebanese who are unwilling to pay the price for this war - especially now that Israel has decided to withdraw. Hezbollah is happy with the Grapes of Wrath understandings, because it feels that Israel lacks adequate tactical responses to its attacks. The bottom line: Hezbollah is only partly deterred by the Israel Defense Forces, and it is reasonable to expect another test of strength between the two.

Hezbollah's sponsor, Iran, wants to maintain the organization's present level of strength and to sabotage the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Faced with the option of firing Katyushas at the Galilee versus that of keeping Hezbollah strong, Tehran prefers the second alternative. If the military situation deteriorates, the Iranians will give Hezbollah the capacity to strike more deeply into Israeli territory and will not refrain, if necessary, from the possibility of Iranian commanders giving orders to Hezbollah personnel on the Lebanese front. The bottom line: Nothing is deterring the Iranians because they do not have to pay a price for their actions.

Syria is supporting Hezbollah operations within certain limitations on the assumption that these operations will weaken Israel's stance in the dispute over the Golan Heights. Damascus is troubled by Washington's support for Israel's latest retaliatory moves in Lebanon and fears a major Israeli counter-offensive. Syria supports the Grapes of Wrath understandings because it believes that they offer Hezbollah a short-term edge. If Israel unilaterally withdraws from Lebanon, the Syrians will continue to support Hezbollah operations even after the withdrawal. The risks to all the parties involved, including Syria, will increase. The bottom line: Israel's deterrent impact on Syria is partial at best. Although the Syrian army is weaker, Damascus still has indirect military options at various levels.

Heading the list of the Barak government's priorities is the attainment of a peace treaty with Syria. In its retaliatory moves, Israel is careful not to attack the Syrians. To ensure continued American support, Israel is also careful not to indiscriminately attack Lebanese civilians.

Faced with the option of striking villages from which Hezbollah has launched an attack versus striking Lebanese infrastructures, Israel prefers the second alternative. Israel feels that, in this situation, it is free to violate the Grapes of Wrath understandings and, in the process, to increase its deterrent strength. The Israelis will take care not to push Hezbollah into a corner where it will feel that it has no alternative but to fire Katyusha rockets at Israeli communities.

Israel is not calling for the understandings' repeal but rather for their amendment. Barak cannot ignore Israeli public opinion nor can he forget his commitment to withdraw from Lebanon by July 7, 2000. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful whether Israel can achieve a decisive victory. The bottom line: Israel wants to deter its enemies but is also deterring itself. If we withdraw to the international border without an agreement and with a deadlock in the peace talks with Syria, the fighting might become heavier