Overcoming the Shepherdstown failure
(Political Commentary- from the Haaretz)
By Ze'ev Schiff
Israeli officials were amazed to hear that their Washington counterparts believe the Syrians were more flexible than they were during the Shepherdstown talks. The Israelis had the impression that the Syrians were inflexible, avoided personal contact, set preconditions for the talks and leaked information from the negotiations. But the Americans consider the Shepherdstown conference a failure and say that this time responsibility does not lie with Damascus.They presume that something happened to the Israelis between the moment of Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara's first meeting at the White House, and the talks in Shepherdstown. Barak radiated optimism on the first occasion, while at Shepherdstown he became reserved. The Syrians, on the other hand, agreed, for example, to soften their position regarding the areas of demilitarization and thinning of forces. In the past they had demanded 6 kilometers of demilitarized territory within Israel for every 10 kilometers of demilitarized territory within Syria, but at Shepherdstown they agreed to a relationship of 5 kilometers to 10 kilometers. A small change, but a symbolic one. The representatives of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued that only those areas from which the Israel Defense Forces were to withdraw - and not Israeli territory - should be demilitarized.
Now the Americans are looking for ideas to prevent a repetition of the mistakes of the past. Somebody convinced them that it would be better to conduct the negotiations in small groups rather than large forums. If this is adopted, most of the experts and cabinet ministers would stay at home, and those who did attend would be of one mind. The Syrians would be asked to deposit their plans in the way of security arrangements and normalization and perhaps also address the issue of corrections to the boundaries. The Israelis would be asked to sketch their view of the June 4, 1967 borders.
The problem is that after Israel's sad experience with the deposit in which the late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin indicated to the Americans that he would consider a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights if his security and water demands were met, some observers believe that the pockets of the Americans are filled with holes through which such deposits fall before their time - as Rabin's did.
Barak recently tackled the issue of the June 4, 1967 borders, in telling his ministers that his four predecessors had agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights and that some of them had spoken of these borders. If that is the case, why is he reticent to draft a map showing how he sees the June 4, 1967 borders, including Lake Kinneret and the Jordan River? Barak is not completely correct in claiming that former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed to the June 4, 1967 borders. He also exaggerated when he said that Netanyahu agreed to these borders, just as Netanyahu exaggerated when he said that Syrian President Hafez Assad had agreed to leave the early-warning station on Mount Hermon in Israeli hands. Assad said he would be willing for Israelis with dual nationality to be integrated into the foreign force that will control the station. He conditioned any Israeli presence on the maintenance of confidentiality. Later he said that confidences are not kept in Israel, and therefore he was not sure that such an arrangement was possible.
Regarding Rabin's promise to Syria with respect to the June 4, 1967 borders, the question is what Barak and his adviser Danny Yatom would be saying if Rabin were still alive. Those close to Rabin said the opposite of what Barak and Yatom are saying today. When the matter of the "deposit" was first published in Ha'aretz, the head of Rabin's negotiating team with the Syrians, Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, responded with great reservation regarding Rabin's promises to the Syrians and he has maintained this position. The Americans also said there was no commitment to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 borders. Barak can change his mind, but why pin on Rabin things that he never said or did?
After the Syrians told the Americans recently that they will not back down on the issue of Mount Hermon, it can be expected that the next step will be an attempt to persuade public opinion that the early-warning station is not important and that there are good alternatives to it. Before sliding into the new "informational" stage, the cabinet ministers should first ask Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and the heads of Military Intelligence for their opinions on Mount Hermon. They are sure to say that the stations are important for the foreseeable future and that the alternatives are not completely satisfactory. Barak is of course entitled to think that peace with the Syrians is more important than the early-warning station, but he should not tell the Israelis that everything said up to now on this issue was nothing but empty propaganda